The Great
Introduction
The Great Recession from December 2007 to June 2009 is associated with tremendous job destruction and costly adjustment for those workers whose jobs were lost. The labor market recovered very slowly, and by some measures the recovery is not yet complete, even more than 6 years later. The unemployment rate remained stubbornly high for several years, durations of unemployment continue to be unprecedentedly long, part-time employment rates remain elevated, and wage growth is sluggish. In this study I use the Displaced Workers Surveys (DWS), administered every two years from 1984-2016 as a supplement to the Current Population Survey (CPS), to examine the experience of job losers during and after the Great Recession and to compare their experience to that of earlier job losers. The January 2010 DWS is of particular interest since it covers job loss during the period of the Great Recession (2007) (2008) (2009) , and the succeeding three DWSs (2012 DWSs ( , 2014 DWSs ( , and 2016 shed important light on the experience of post-recession job losers in a labor market that was still recovering from the Great Recession.
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The central focus of my analysis is on the employment, hours, and earnings losses suffered by full-time job losers.
2 I distinguish three sources of earnings loss among full-time job losers:
1. Non-employment -Full-time job losers who are not reemployed suffer a complete loss of earnings mitigated to some extent by unemployment insurance benefits.
2. Part-time reemployment -Full-time job losers who take part-time jobs suffer a partial loss of earnings, both as a result of lower work hours and the lower average hourly earnings generally received for part-time work.
3. Lower earnings for full-time work -Full-time job losers who do find a new full-time job may have reduced earnings on their new job.
1 Examples of earlier work using the DWS includes Farber (1997 Farber ( , 2013 , Podgursky and Swaim (1987) , Kletzer (1989) , Topel (1990) , Gardner (1995) , Neal (1995) , Hipple (1999) , and Schmeider and von Wachter (2010) . See Fallick (1996) and Farber (2004) for reviews of the earlier literature.
2 Analyses of the cost of job loss based solely on employment and earnings of the sort I present here abstracts from the value of non-market time that is "enjoyed" by the unemployed. This is a factor stressed by some recent work in macroeconomics (e.g., Hagedorn, M., and I. Manovskii (2008) and Chodorow-Reich and Karabarbounis (2016) ). Additionally, analyses focused solely on employment and earnings ignore nonincome related (perhaps psychological and social) costs of job loss. In other words, my analysis is about earnings losses rather than utility losses suffered by displaced workers or any losses that are external to the individual.
I use the information in the DWS to decompose earnings losses for full-time job losers into components due to each of these three sources.
The study of worker displacement, both through plant closings, large layoffs, and smaller events is an important focus of work in recent years. While much earlier work uses data from the DWS, a body of more recent work builds on the seminal study of Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) using adminstrative data (e.g., Couch and Placzek, 2010; Davis and von Wachter, 2011; Song and Von Wachter, 2014) . The work using the DWS and the work using administrative data are complementary in the sense that they address related but somewhat different dimensions of the cost of job loss. The DWS is well suited for the study of short run employment outcomes of job losers and declines in weekly earnings for reemployed job losers. In the context of this study, the DWS allows direct analysis of the role of hours of work (non-employment and part-time employment) in accounting for earnings declines after job loss. In contrast, the administrative data, usually quarterly data from state unemployment insurance records or Social Security Administration data, can be used to study earnings losses over longer periods of time and to calculate the total dollar value of lost income, but it cannot be used to study hours of work or movements in weekly earnings.
I begin in the next section with a brief presentation of movements over time in key labor market indicators derived from the CPS. These include the unemployment rate, the average duration of unemployment spells, the employment-population ratio, and key monthly transition rates between labor force states (exit rates from employment and unemployment).
These highlight the severity of the Great Recession and the slow recovery. I also present data on part-time employment rates and transitions rates between labor force states that make distinctions between full-time and part-time employment in order to set the stage for the later analysis. In section 3, I describe the data I use from the DWS and discuss measurement and data issues relevant to the analysis of job loss. Section 4 contains an analysis of the incidence of job loss. Next, I analyze the consequences of job loss in several dimensions. I begin in section 5 with an investigation of post-displacement labor force status, employment probabilities, and the likelihood of part-and full-time employment. In section 6, I consider the decline in weekly earnings due to displacement. This section includes a decomposition of the decline in weekly earnings due non-employment, part-time employment, and any decline in earnings suffered by those job losers who are reemployed full-time. In section 7, I investigate the extent to which some full-time job losers may, in fact, be reemployed in a better (higher paying) job than the lost job. Section 8 contains a discussion of the findings and concluding remarks. 3 There has been substantial variation in labor market conditions over the period covered by the DWS , and substantial cyclical variation in the unemployment rate is evident. The early 1980s saw a sharp increase in the unemployment rate to almost 11 percent as a consequence of the July 1981 -November 1982 recession. This increase was followed by a long decline in during the remainder of the 1980s and then by milder cyclical variation followed by a long decline to about 4 percent in early 2000. After the comparatively mild recession in 2001, the unemployment rate again declined to about 4.5 percent in 2007 before rising sharply as a consequence of the Great Recession.
The high unemployment rate experienced in the Great Recession was slow to return to pre-recession levels. The seasonally-adjusted unemployment rate peaked at 10.0 percent in the first quarter of 2010, was still at 9.5 percent in the fourth quarter of 2010, more than A related concern is the unprecedentedly long average duration of unemployment spells. This is illustrated in figure 2, which shows both the mean and median seasonally adjusted duration of unemployment for spells in progress, quarterly from 1978-2016q2. This figure   clearly shows the counter-cyclical nature of unemployment duration. The mean unemployment rate reached about 20 weeks in the three earlier recessions show but rose to 37 weeks in the Great Recession. The figure further indicates a continuing increase in mean unemployment duration into 2011 (mean duration 36.9 weeks in 2011Q4) before falling somewhat to about 25 weeks early in 2016. The median showed a similar pattern, reaching about 10 weeks in earlier recessions but increasing to 25 weeks in the most recent recession. More than 6 years after end of the Great Recession, both mean and median duration of unemployment spells in progress remain above anything seen prior to the Great Recession.
These high unemployment rates and long spell durations reflect in large measure changes 
Part-Time Employment
Part-time work is defined in the CPS as fewer than 35 hours per week. Part-time workers are queried on the reason for working fewer than 35 hours and can be classified as "part-time for noneconomic reasons" (also referred as "voluntary part-time") and "part-time for economic reasons" (also referred to as "involuntary part-time"). The voluntary part-time are those who are part-time as the result of a labor supply decision based on personal reasons such as family obligations, school enrollment, or simply desiring fewer than full-time hours. The involuntary part-time are workers who report that they would like to work full-time but cannot find a full-time job or their current job has cut back hours.
5 The 1994 CPS redesign changed the battery of questions about hours of work on the current job in a way that may have raised the fraction of workers reporting they are currently working part time, both over The effect of the CPS redesign on measurement of hours of work is discussed in detail by Polivka and Miller (1998 A reasonable interpretation of these patterns is that in the Great Recession a higher fraction of unemployed workers seeking full-time jobs found part-time jobs (rather than full-time jobs) and that this offset the general decline in the availability of both full-and I turn now to analyses of the experience of displaced workers in order to understand more about the incidence and consequences of job loss in the Great Recession and the slow recovery.
I start with a brief description of the Displaced Workers Survey followed by an analysis of job loss rates. I then present an analysis of the employment and earnings consequences of job loss, focusing particularly on the extent to which full-time job losers are reemployed, are reemployed part-time, and the magnitude and sources of earnings losses of job losers. To investigate the consequences of job loss, I use a set of followup questions in the DWS asked of workers who report having lost a job. Unfortunately, since 1994, the follow-up questions were asked only of job losers whose reported reason for the job loss was one of three reasons: slack work, plant closing, or position/shift abolished. I term these the "big three" reasons. Workers who lost jobs due to the ending of a temporary job, the ending of a self-employment situation, or "other" reasons were not asked the follow-up questions.
To maintain comparability across years my analysis of post-job-loss experience, regardless of year, uses only workers who lost jobs for one of the "big three" reasons. Additionally, in order to have a consistent sample over time, I do not use information on the post job-loss experience of job losers in the 1984-1992 DWS whose reported job loss was more than three years prior to the interview date.
There are some important issues of definition implicit in the design of this question that are not always recognized in analyses using the DWS. Job loss as measured in these data almost certainly does not represent all job loss about which we ought to be concerned.
Specifically, the distinction between quits and layoffs is not always clear. Firms may wish to reduce employment without laying off workers, and they might accomplish this by reducing or failing to raise wages. 8 This can encourage workers (perhaps those having better alternatives) to quit. Other workers (perhaps those having worse alternatives) might be willing to continue to work at reduced wages. To the extent that these are important phenomena, the sample of individuals observed to be displaced by the definition used in the DWS is a potentially non-random sub-sample of all displaced workers. The consequences of this are difficult to measure, but it is worth noting that the ability of employers to offer at least nominal wage decreases to their workers can be quite limited (Bewley, 1999) , a factor that may be 7 There are important issues of measurement and interpretation that arise when comparing job loss rates calculated using the DWS over time, including changes in wording of the key questions as well as the change in 1994 in the recall period from five years to three years. See Farber (1997) and Farber (2004) for detailed discussions of these issues and the procedures I use to reweight the data to yield adjusted job loss rates that are comparable over time. Additionally, the job loss rate fell much more quickly after the 2010 DWS than did the 9 All counts in the figures I present are weighted using the CPS sampling weights.
10 Another possibility would be to use the average unemployment rate for the three years preceding each survey. However, reported rates of job loss are always higher in the year immediately preceding the survey relative to the rates of job loss two and three years preceding the survey. This may be the result of recall bias noted by Topel (1990) . Empirically, the correlation of the rate of job loss with the unemployment rate in the year preceding the survey (ρ =0.79) is much higher than the correlation of the rate of job loss with the average unemployment rate in the three years preceding the survey (ρ = 0.45). unemployment rate.
While not presented here, I analyzed variation in job loss rates by important demographic characteristics including education, age, and tenure on the lost job.
11 Not surprisingly, job loss rates are substantially higher for less educated workers than for more educated workers, but job loss rates for all educational categories show a strong counter-cyclical pattern. Job loss rates are highest for the youngest workers (20-29) and generally show the standard cyclical pattern. There has been some convergence over time in rates of job loss by age, with the rates for older workers increasing relative to those for younger workers. As expected, the job loss rate is monotonically decreasing with tenure in every time period. The job loss rate is far higher and more cyclically sensitive for workers in the first year of their job than for workers in any other tenure category. 
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All three elements of the right-hand side of these relationships are observable in the basic CPS or the DWS for the appropriate years. . This fact together with the fact that the job-loss rate, shown in figure 9, is higher for full-time workers than for part-time workers suggests that a very large share of total job loss is from full-time jobs. Simple analysis based on the observed FT/PT shares and the conditional job loss rates calculated using equations 1 and 2 shows that 88 percent of all job loss observed in the DWS since 1996 is from full-time jobs. The full-time share of total job loss is counter-cyclical, with the highest levels reached time employment are calculated from the basic CPS for the recall period associated with each DWS. For example, the probability of part-time employment for 2014 is the average part-time share of employment for the three-year period 2011-2013. I do not calculate this share for 1994 since there are no comparable data on part-time rates prior to 1994 (Polivka and Miller, 1998 There are important differences between full-time and part-time job losers in their postjob-loss experience. In particular, as I show below, part-time job losers are more likely than full-time job losers to exit the labor force and are less likely than full-time job losers to be unemployed. While I can't observe whether part-time job losers were voluntary or involuntary part-time, over three-quarters of overall part-time employment in the period studied is voluntary, suggesting lower attachment to the labor force. It is reasonable to conclude that full-time workers (and job losers) have a stronger attachment to the labor force than part-time workers (and job losers). On this basis, most of my analysis of the consequences of job loss will focus on the experience of the 88 percent of job losers who lost full-time jobs.
Post-Displacement Employment Experience
The first-order problem faced by job losers is finding another job, and success in doing so is an important factor mitigating earnings losses. I start with an examination of how the survey-date employment rate of job losers has varied over time, both overall and by FT-PT status on the lost job. I follow this with an analysis of the time until re-employment for those job losers who did find a new job, and I conclude this section with an analysis of the survey-date full-and part-time status of reemployed job losers. In order to investigate differences in post-displacement labor force status across workers with different demographic characteristics, I estimate a linear probability model of postjob-loss employment that accounts for differences in sex, race, age (5 categories), education (4 categories), tenure on the lost job (5 categories), the number of years between the job loss and the survey date (3 categories), FT/PT status on the lost job, and survey year (16 categories). While changes in demographic characteristics could account for some of the time series patterns shown in figure 10, this turns out not to be the case. The regression adjusted yearly means are virtually identical to those shown for all job losers in figure 10 (ρ = 0.99).
Survey Date Employment Status of Job Losers
This implies that any changes in the characteristics of job losers over time are unrelated to the time-series movements in post-displacement employment probabilities.
The linear probability model shows substantial differences in post-displacement employment probabilities for workers of different characteristics, and I examine these directly. The first column of table 1 contains estimates of a linear probability model of post-job-loss employment at the DWS survey date using date from the 1994-2016 DWS. These estimates 1984-2016 1988-2016 1994-2016 1994-2016 1994- show that more educated workers are substantially more likely to be employed subsequent to job loss, with a college -high school gap in the employment probability of 12. 
The Length of Time to Find and Job
The DWS is not well designed to study the length of time it takes job losers to find another I proceed with an analysis of average weeks to find a job conditional on finding a job. This is plotted in figure 11 . The time to find a job, after declining from the mid 1980s through reemployed high-tenure job losers take longer to find a new job, even after accounting for age. The relationship is monotone. Relative to workers who lost very short jobs, those who lost a job with 3-10 years tenure take 2 weeks longer to find a job while those with more than 20 year tenure on the lost job take 4 weeks longer. Reemployed females and nonwhites take one to two weeks longer to find jobs.
Interestingly, those who lost their job more than one year ago take substantially more time to find their new job (6 to 8 weeks more). It may be that those who report losing a job in the year immediately prior to the survey have not had much time to search (and so mechanically cannot report long durations). This is also consistent with the pattern of lower reemployment probabilities for those who lost jobs in the year prior to the survey (column 1 of table 1). Another explanation may be related to recall bias (Topel, 1990) . If, with the passage of time, job losses with more serious consequences are more likely to be recalled, then the job losses reported having happened more than one year before the survey date would more likely be those with longer post-job-loss spells of non-employment. There are systematic differences by demographic characteristics in hours of work among re-employed job losers. In order to investigate this, I present estimates of linear probability models of FT, IV-PT, and V-PT employment for re-employed job losers in columns 4-6 respectively, of table 1. Workers with more education are more likely to be working fulltime and less likely to be working involuntary part-time. The relationships with age are non-monotonic. The youngest (20-24) and oldest (55-64) job losers are less likely to be working full-time and more likely to be voluntary part-time than prime-age job losers (25-54). Workers who lost a job on which they had more tenure are more likely to be full-time and less likely to be involuntary part-time. More time since job loss increases the probability of full-time employment and decreases the probability of involuntary part-time employment.
Hours of Re-employed Job Losers
This suggests that job losers take part-time jobs but continue to search for full-time jobs.
Female job losers are less likely to be full-time and more likely to be voluntary part-time. 16 The analysis of the FT/PT status of job losers is limited to the 1994-2014 period due to the difficulty in defining comparable measures of voluntary and involuntary part-time employment before and after the 1994 CPS redesign.
17 Recall that the DWS does not collect information for part-time job losers on whether the lost part-time job was voluntary or involuntary part-time. The overall pattern that I have described in this section highlight just how serious the effect of the Great Recession was on the ability of job losers to find employment, and, particularly, full-time employment. The perhaps surprising general finding is that even by 2015
(the last year covered by the DWS and 6 years after the end of the Great Recession) is that the ability of job losers to find new jobs remains compromised. The full-time employment share remains depressed, and the involuntary part time employment share remains high.
Real Earnings Consequences of Job Loss
To focus my analysis of real earnings loss, I limit my analysis to losers of full-time jobs (88 percent of all DWS job loss), and I define the change in earnings of a job loser to be the difference between real weekly earnings in the DWS survey week and real weekly earnings on the lost job as reported in the DWS.
A descriptive framework for decomposing the proportional change in weekly earnings experienced by full-time job losers into these three channels is as follows. The average proportional change in real weekly earnings is
where W 0 is pre-displacement weekly earnings, W F is post-displacement full-time weekly earnings, W P is post-displacement part-time weekly earnings, and P F , P P , and P N represent the probabilities of reemployment full-time, reemployment part-time and no reemployment respectively (P F + P P + P N = 1). The first term in equation 3 is the contribution of the change in weekly earnings of the full-time reemployed, the second term is the contribution of the change in weekly earnings of the part-time reemployed, and the third term is the contribution of the change in weekly earnings of those not reemployed.
In order to get an idea of the average magnitudes of the contributions of the elements of this decomposition, the overall average values for full-time job losers for the period are Given the high non-employment rates of job losers, it is not surprising that most earnings loss is borne by these workers. But it also overstates the long-run earnings effect of job loss since many of these workers will likely be re-employed at some point. It is useful to redo this decomposition focusing only on the earnings loss of re-employed job losers. This is While it is not surprising that the weekly earnings losses suffered by workers making a FT-PT transition are substantial, it is surprising that the average weekly earnings decline suffered by full-time job losers who find another full-time job are very small (about 1.5 percent). 21 However, there is considerable heterogeneity both across workers and over time in earnings losses for full-time job losers. In order to explore this heterogeneity, I estimate WLS regression models of the proportional earnings change of full-time job losers. These models include DWS survey year fixed effects along with controls for demographic characteristics (education, age, sex, race), tenure on the lost job, time since job loss. Figure 13 contains the estimates of year-specific intercepts (the year fixed effects) which represent the regressionadjusted average earnings changes of full-time job losers in the base group calculated at the median for each control variable (white males, age 35-44 with 12 years of education and 21 I note that my earlier work using the DWS (e.g., Farber (2004 ), Farber (2013 reports substantially larger earnings declines for workers making a FT-FT transition. It is with some embarrassment that I recognize that the earlier work reports the proportional wage change implied by the average log wage change rather than the average of the individual proportional wage changes themselves. This can be misleading because the individual proportional wage changes are quite variable and are not well approximated by the individual changes in log wages. Importantly, the proportional wage change implied by the average change in log wages is generally smaller (more negative) than the simple average of the proportional wage changes. The estimates of the year-specific regression-adjusted average earnings change for the base group using on a sample of all full-time job losers, including those who are not employed at the survey date, are represented by the lower line in figure 13 . Because the proportional earnings change of the not-employed is -1, these average proportional earnings changes are substantially negative in all years (average of yearly changes -21.6 percent) and has substantial cyclical variation, ranging from -38.8 percent in 2010 (the Great Recession) to -5.3 percent in 2000 (a strong labor market). The earnings loss has declined since the Great recession (to 13.7 percent in 2016), and it is only now back to pre-recession levels. The estimates in column 2 of table 2 abstract from the employment probability by focusing on the subgroup of full-time job losers who are employed at the survey date. Here Note: Based on data from the 1984-2016 DWS. Weighted by CPS sampling weights. The base category is at the median for each variable and consists of white males aged 35-44 with 12 years of education and 1-3 years of tenure and who lost a job in the second calendar year prior to the survey date. All models include a complete set of survey year fixed effects. These estimated year fixed effects related to the models in columns 1, 2, and 4 are presented in figure 13 . Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
the differences by education, race, and time since job loss are greatly attenuated, again suggesting that substantial variation in earnings loss is driven by variation in the likelihood of finding employment. However, substantial differences in earnings loss by sex, age, and tenure on the lost job remain when considering only reemployed job losers. The estimates in columns 3 and 4 account for part-time employment on the job held at the survey date (column 3 with an explicit control and column 4 by limiting the sample to those making a FT-FT transition). Once FT/PT status on the new job is accounted for, there is no difference in the average earning change by sex. However, substantial differences by age and tenure remain, with older and higher tenure workers suffering larger earnings declines.
The clear messages from figure 13 and table 2 are 1) that most earnings decline of fulltime job losers comes from lack of employment subsequent to job loss and 2) the "average" full-time reemployed job loser does not suffer much of a decline in earnings. However, some subgroups of reemployed full-time job losers do suffer large earnings declines. This is particularly true for high-tenure job losers who may lose substantial specific human capital, making it difficult to find a new job that pays even close to earnings on the lost job.
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7 Can Job Loss be a Good Thing for Some Workers?
It is clear that the overall costs of job loss in the form of lost and lower earnings are very large. The primary cause is a reduction in hours of work. A substantial fraction of job losers are not reemployed at the subsequent DWS survey date (almost 35 percent in the most recent period, figure 10 ). By definition, all of these workers are earning less than they earned prior to the job loss. Even reemployed job losers take substantial time, on average, to find a job (about 12 weeks in the most recent period, figure 11), and (abstracting from any unemployment insurance benefits received) this implies substantial additional earnings losses. Additionally, a substantial fraction of reemployed full-time job losers are employed part-time (about 15 percent in the latest period, figure 12) , and a very large fraction (at least 88 percent) of these are earning less on their new job than they earned on the lost job.
Thus, average earnings losses are substantial.
However, the loss of a full-time job may be good for some workers, at least in the narrow sense that the job held subsequent to job loss may be better than the lost job, and I investigate this possibility here. For the purposes of this analysis, I define "better" to mean higher real weekly earnings on the new job relative to the lost job. But, given that earnings surely reported with error in the CPS/DWS, it is not straightforward to calculate the fraction with positive earnings changes. For example, if the true average real earnings change is negative and measurement error is classical (independent of true earnings, zero mean), then the presence of measurement error will cause the fraction of observed wage differences that are positive to overstate the fraction of true wage differences that are positive. In what follows, I lay out a simple representation of observed wages with measurement error and make a generous correction for measurement error (building on the work of Bound and Krueger (1991) ) to adjust the observed fraction positive.
Suppose that actual log earnings of worker i in period t is Y * it but that these log earnings are observed with error η it so that observed log earnings are
The observed change in log earnings between the pre-loss job (period 0) and the post-loss job (period 1) is
For the purposes of calculating a corrected fraction ∆Y * positive, I proceed by assuming that true log weekly earnings are normally distributed with mean µ t and variance σ 2 * t . I further assume that the measurement error is classical and normally distributed with mean zero and variance σ 2 η and that the measurement error is uncorrelated with true earnings and uncorrelated over time.
The variance of the actual change in log earnings is σ can be smaller than the variance of the earnings levels so that the signal to noise ratio in the observed earnings difference can be quite low.
Using the assumption of normality, the probability that an observed log earnings change is positive is 2 η , the probability that the true earnings change is positive is
Clearly, the fraction positive among the reported earnings changes is a biased estimate of the fraction positive among true earnings changes. This bias is
This bias is positive when the average earnings change is negative (µ 1 − µ 0 < 0), and the size of the bias increases with the variance of the measurement error (σ 2 η ). In order to quantify the size of the bias in the fraction positive due to measurement error, I need estimates of relevant means and variances, all but one of which are observed in the DWS data. Those observed include P (∆Y i > 0), µ 1 −µ 0 , and σ ∆ . The key missing parameter is the variance of the measurement error (σ 2 η ). I make generous estimates of this parameter based on the analysis of Bound and Krueger (1991) , who used CPS earnings data from the March annual supplement matched to employer-reported Social Security earnings records in 1978 to estimate the extent of measurement error assuming that the Social Security earnings records were error free. Understanding that these data are very old by now and that the CPS underwent a substantial redesign in 1994 that may have affected the accuracy of the data collected, I use their estimates only to get an idea of the general magnitude of the measurement error.
I ignore certain features of their analysis, particularly their finding that measurement error in successive years is positively correlated. I do this for two reasons. First, it is likely that most of their CPS respondents in successive years are in the same job and so perceive compensation similarly over time and so make similar errors in reporting earnings, while my analysis of the DWS is for a group of workers, all of whom have changed jobs. Thus, it is likely that any temporal correlation in measurement error is smaller in the DWS. Second, my aim is to use a generous estimate of the measurement error variance in order to derive a lower-bound estimate of the probability of a positive earnings change for job losers. I also ignore their finding of a correlation between the measurement error and true (Social Security) earnings. Finally, I ignore their finding that men exhibit more measurement error in reported earnings than do women, and I adopt numbers for measurement error that are larger than even those found by Bound and Krueger for men in order to be conservative. The observed fractions positive in column 3 are based simple tabulations of the observed difference in weekly earnings between the survey-date job and the lost job. The predicted fractions positive in column 3 are based on the assumption that the difference in weekly earnings is log-normal and calculated using the observed mean and variance of the difference in log weekly earnings. The measurement error adjusted predicted fractions positive in column 5 are based on the assumption of log-normality and an additional assumption that observed level of log earnings contain measurement error such that the variance of the measurement error is 20 percent of the observed variance of log earnings. The sample is trimmed by deleting the smallest and largest one percent of observed earnings changes. See text for more details. Age and tenure are certainly positively correlated, and the relationships shown in figure   14 are strictly bivariate. One possibility is that only one of age or tenure is driving the negative relationships of the fraction with positive earnings changes with these variables.
However, the multivariate analysis of proportional wage changes shown in the fourth column of table 2 for job losers making a FT-FT transition show that significant negative effects of both age and tenure remain. These estimates imply a difference in the average real wage change between the youngest and oldest job losers of about 14 percentage points controlling for tenure. Coincidentally, I find a similar 14 percentage point difference in the real wage change between the least tenured and most tenured job losers controlling for age. Clearly, both older and more highly tenured full-time job losers suffer larger earnings declines and are less likely to earn more on their new full-time job.
The finding that many job losers, particularly those who are younger and have not been on their job for long, find a higher paying job raises the interesting question of why it is they did not quit their original jobs and take the new higher-paying jobs voluntarily. Why did they need the "kick in the rear" of job loss in order to take these new higher-paying job?
There are some obvious and not-so-obvious answers to these questions.
• Importantly, the new job may not be better than the lost job (not yield higher utility than the lost job) despite offering higher earnings. There are many job attributes that are relevant to the job choice decision. A few of these include general interest, opportunities for advancement, the nature of coworkers, the commute, hours, and fringe benefits.
• Job change can be costly. Search is not easy or costless. It takes time, during which the individual is not employed and, hence, not earning. Individuals may have to move to take a new job. It is worth noting that the two groups of job losers who are most likely to earn more on their new job (younger and less tenured workers) are among those with the highest post-loss employment rates and the shortest time to find a new job (table 1) . Even so, it is likely that the cost of job change can be large.
• If workers are risk averse with respect to the uncertainties surrounding new employment they may not be willing to change voluntarily to a new job that, ex post, turns out to offer higher earnings and utility. And, if workers are loss averse, the possibility that a new job may result in a loss is even more likely to outweigh an expected gain in pay.
• Coming at it from a different angle, there is some recent experimental work (Levitt 2016) suggesting that individuals may be reluctant to make important life changes generally, including quitting a job, that result in a higher reported ex post level of happiness on average. This suggests that encouraging some workers to change jobs could result in higher utility. In other words, job loss may be good for a minority of workers.
Concluding Remarks
My estimates of the costs of job loss based on the DWS show that displacement imposes a significant economic burden on job losers. The first part of these costs are in the form of difficulty in finding new employment and, importantly, difficulty in finding full-time employment. This component of costs was particularly severe for workers losing jobs in the Great Recession, when less than 50 percent of full-time job losers reported being employed at the next DWS survey date (January 2010). And 20 percent of these full-time job losers who did find jobs were employed part-time at the survey date.
Importantly, the adverse employment experience of full-time job losers continued beyond the Great Recession. While employment rates and full-time employment rates improved, those who lost jobs even two to four years after the Great Recession (2011-2013) had low employment rates and low full-time employment rates by historical standards. This is consistent with the rather slow decline in the unemployment rate and the continuing high level of long-term unemployment in the aftermath of the Great Recession. The long run consequences of the decreased ability to find employment subsequent to job loss and resulting long spells of unemployment may be self-reinforcing in that some of these job losers, perhaps by being scarred by a long spell of unemployment or simply perceived by employers as less able workers, may have serious long-run difficulty in finding work.
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My analysis of the DWS shows modest average weekly earnings declines for reemployed full-time job losers who are able to find a new full-time job, and these average earnings declines were not especially large by historical standards in the Great Recession or its aftermath. However, focusing on the average earnings decline masks substantial heterogeneity across workers, with older and more tenured job losers suffering substantial earnings losses.
Interestingly, a substantial fraction of full-time job losers who are reemployed full-time are earning more in real terms on their new job than on the lost job, with the "winners" concentrated among younger and less tenured job losers.
The earnings declines I estimate generally are smaller than those that are derived using administrative data.
26 This is true for several reasons. Importantly, the concept of earning change that I estimate using the DWS, weekly earnings for full-time workers, is more like a wage rate. In contrast, the administrative data, typically from UI or Social Security records, records quarterly earnings. Quarterly hours are likely be quite variable across weeks within a quarter relative to the weekly hours of a full-time worker, particularly after a job loss.
Immediately after job loss, there will be whole or part quarters during which workers are without jobs. Additionally, the earnings loss measure from administrative data includes the loss in quarterly earnings that comes from a move from full-time to part-time employment that is a consequence of job loss I document using the DWS. And, to the extent that the employment experience of workers subsequent to job loss is less secure, there are likely to be partial quarters of non-employment even later. The result will be continued lower earnings that are due to lower hours worked as well as potentially lower weekly earnings when employed full time.
The earnings decline measure from the DWS is appropriate for understanding how job loss affects the earnings that a full-time employed former job-loser is able to command (essentially 25 The evidence on this question from a set of recent audit studies is mixed. Kroft, Lange, and Notowidigdo (2013) find that the callback rate for job applications "submitted by" younger workers (less than 35 years of age) is negatively related to the duration of unemployment. However, Nunley, et. at. (2014) do not find such a relationship for young college educated workers, and Farber, Silverman, and Von Wachter (2016) find no such relationship for older workers. Eriksson and Rooth (2014) find that call-backs are, at best, weakly negatively related to unemployment duration in a Swedish audit study. 26 The large earnings losses found in administrative data were highlighted by Jacobsen, LaLonde, and Sullivan (1993) . von Wachter, Handwerker, and Hildreth (2009) explicitly investigate reasons why the DWS and administrative data from California in the 1990s seem to yield different measures of earnings loss. Couch and Placzek (2010) and Davis and von Wachter (2011) are other examples of relatively large estimates of earning loss after displacement. a wage rate). This is important for understanding a range of important issues. One example is the relationship between earnings loss and tenure focusing on the potential importance of specific capital (Kletzer, 1989; Topel, 1990; Neal, 1995; Parent, 2000) . However, the DWS measure of weekly earnings change alone does not capture the full earnings cost of job loss because it does not account for time spent by a full-time job loser without a job or time spent working part-time until a full-time job is found.
To conclude, while job loss is a fact of life in the U.S., the employment consequences of job loss in the Great Recession have been unusually severe and remain substantial years later. Most importantly, job losers in the Great Recession and its aftermath have been much less successful at finding new jobs (particularly full-time jobs) than in earlier periods. The decreased ability of full-time job losers in recent years to find new full-time employment reinforces the findings from studies of job loss using administrative data that job loss has long run adverse consequences for employment and earnings. However, my analysis suggests there are winners and losers among displaced workers. The "winners" are those who find new full-time employment without much delay and earn more on the new job (generally younger and lower tenure job losers). But the majority of displaced workers are "losers" in that they have difficulty finding new full-time employment and earn less subsequently.
